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On April 17, Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force, released his third major statement on Competitive Endurance — a strategic framework designed to guide the U.S. Space Force in achieving space superiority. Titled Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners, this new document builds upon Gen. Saltzman’s 2023 keynote and his 2024 white paper, cementing Competitive Endurance as a foundational theory for U.S. military space power.
The question now is whether Gen. Saltzman should immediately begin applying all three Competitive Endurance documents to address specific space-based threats. Doing so would accelerate the shift from theory to practice, enabling the Space Force to develop operational plans, relevant capabilities and actionable responses tailored to real-world space threats.
To assess the practical utility of Competitive Endurance, it is essential to first apply the framework to specific threats — one at a time. Two key questions guide this approach:
- Can the framework be applied to a specific space threat to generate countermeasures more quickly, more cost-effectively, or both, compared to traditional ad hoc methods?
- Can the process of applying the framework to individual threats also serve to refine and improve the overall theory — effectively using each application as a form of iterative training?
To explore both questions, I focus on a particularly urgent and illustrative case: China’s so-called “space stalkers” — dual-use spacecraft designed to shadow, disrupt or disable U.S. satellites. I selected this threat for two reasons. First, I have spent over a decade analyzing its evolution and the counterstrategies necessary to mitigate it. This depth of study allows me to critically evaluate whether Competitive Endurance offers a faster, more effective pathway to solutions.
Second, on April 8, Gen. Stephen Whiting, Commander of U.S. Space Command, stated that the U.S. is prioritizing advanced surveillance tools, maneuverable satellites, and on-orbit defensive and offensive systems as part of a broader “peace through strength” strategy. To counter adversarial dual-use spacecraft like space stalkers, he emphasized that the U.S. is stepping up development of similar dual-use technologies capable of disabling or disrupting enemy systems. If my case study encourages the Space Force to apply the Competitive Endurance framework swiftly to the space stalker threat, it could drive concrete action — such as deploying protective “bodyguard” satellites equipped with the dual-use capabilities Gen. Whiting described. With China nearing the ability to launch a surprise attack using these systems, enhancing deterrence and defense has become both urgent and imperative.
The threat of dual-use spacecraft
Space stalkers can operate covertly under the guise of peaceful purposes, such as satellite servicing — only to later assume hostile postures. China has pursued this capability since at least 2008 and, by 2022, had successfully docked with a non-cooperative satellite in geosynchronous orbit. As Gen. Saltzman warned in his keynote, “We’ve seen a demonstration of a satellite grabbed by another satellite’s robotic arm and pulled out of its mission orbit, and it doesn’t stop at tests.”
Looking ahead, China could soon field a fleet of these spacecraft capable of launching a coordinated disablement campaign against our most important satellites — especially those in high orbits, such as the satellites in semi-synchronous, geosynchronous, and highly elliptical orbits that host constellations critical for position, navigation and timing; command, control and communications; missile early warning and other vital national security functions. A surprise strike targeting these assets, particularly in a Taiwan contingency, could paralyze U.S. space-enabled capabilities during the earliest and most critical stages of a conflict.
Despite the severity of this threat, it remains underappreciated — not only by the public, but even by some within the national security community. These space stalkers represent a new class of antisatellite weapons: discreet, reversible and capable of avoiding debris-generating actions. By gradually maneuvering and prepositioning themselves near their targets under non-threatening pretenses, they gain a first-mover advantage and catch us by surprise — prepared to disable U.S. satellites by bending solar panels and antennas, obscuring sensors, or repositioning them into ineffective orbits.
Applying Competitive Endurance
Gen. Saltzman has outlined three core tenets of Competitive Endurance —”avoid operational surprise,” “deny first-mover advantage in space” and “undertake responsible counterspace campaigning” — to address space threats in general and dual-use ones in particular. These principles go beyond mere deterrence; they offer a disciplined framework for sustained strategic competition, emphasizing preparation, resilience and precision in countering aggression without provoking escalation.
To operationalize this framework, Gen. Saltzman has directed planners to first identify specific adversary systems and capabilities that pose a threat to U.S. space assets and then develop tailored response strategies. Using open-source data, I have estimated that China could deploy up to 200 rendezvous-capable spacecraft within the next several years — enough to threaten 100 high-value U.S. satellites in a single, coordinated strike. These projections should be rigorously validated or refined by Space Force planners and serve as a foundation for readiness and response planning.
In Space Warfighting, Gen. Saltzman stated unequivocally that we must defend U.S. space capabilities. He also underscored the importance of being prepared to employ both offensive and defensive measures to deter or, if necessary, defeat aggression. I have proposed deploying small, inexpensive “bodyguard” spacecraft. These guardians, stationed near high-value satellites, could neutralize stalking spacecraft within predefined self-defense zones — achieving this without generating debris and in line with Saltzman’s principle that space superiority must not come at the expense of long-term space sustainability.
To ensure clarity and reduce risk of miscalculation, I also support Gen. Saltzman’s call for establishing easily understood Rules of Engagement (ROE). I recommend that each orbital zone include clearly defined boundaries and red lines. Spacecraft that cross these limits should be subject to inspection or removal — making every effort to avoid causing damage to the intruders or generating debris. With space stalkers potentially ready to act in the near term, a combination of well-defined ROEs and bodyguard systems may be the only viable defense — especially given the longer timelines needed to develop and deploy alternatives. If more effective alternatives emerge, they should be tested and adopted without delay.
The costs of this defensive posture are reasonable. A rough estimate suggests that producing and deploying 200 bodyguard spacecraft — each weighing around 200 kilograms to protect 100 critical U.S. assets at high orbits, including GPS satellites — would cost approximately $5 billion. Even doubling that to $10 billion remains modest compared to the estimated $1 billion in daily economic losses if GPS service alone were disabled — an estimate reported by L3Harris. That figure does not account for the added impact if other satellite services were also lost. Moreover, this investment would establish a foundation for more advanced space-based capabilities, such as future missile defense elements of the proposed Golden Dome architecture.
Naturally, expert assessments of the severity of the risk and the appropriate countermeasures will vary — which is why one of the most powerful elements of Gen. Saltzman’s approach is his call for collaboration. As he emphasized in his 2023 keynote: “Think deeply and critically about what I’ve proposed here. Challenge the assumptions, make your own assertions, recommendations, test your ideas, share those ideas broadly.” By offering a shared set of metrics to evaluate all proposals, the Competitive Endurance framework enables respectful, constructive debate and collective insight — ultimately paving the way for faster and more cost-effective solutions than today’s often ad hoc approaches. In that sense, the answer to the first guiding question is yes.
Just as important, the answer to the second question is also affirmative. Applying the framework to specific threats is not just a test — it is a form of iterative training. Each real-world use improves the theory itself, helping to refine its categories, sharpen its metrics, and reveal blind spots. Like an AI model that improves through exposure to new data, Competitive Endurance becomes stronger and more adaptive each time it is exercised in practice.
I therefore urge Gen. Saltzman to actively champion the application of his own framework to specific space threats — especially those that are imminent. Beyond space stalking, several space challenges remain insufficiently addressed, often due to unrecognized urgency, outdated assumptions about effective responses or a lack of decisive senior leadership. Now is the time to support Gen. Saltzman’s vision by putting his theory into action — securing not only stability in space, but peace and prosperity here on Earth.
Brian Chow is an independent policy analyst with a Ph.D. in physics, an MBA with distinction, a Ph.D. in finance, and over 180 publications.
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