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China’s persistent use of maritime gray zone tactics poses a fundamental challenge to regional stability and the international order. These actions are designed to achieve strategic aims — territorial advancement and sovereignty erosion — without crossing the threshold of conventional armed conflict. Using ambiguity and indirect coercion, China seeks to “advance without attacking” and shape a favorable strategic environment under the guise of civilian activity.
The modus operandi of gray zone intrusion
China’s “gray zone “ activities refer to a campaign of coercive actions that are aggressive in nature but deliberately kept below the threshold of overt military conflict. These tactics, such as economic coercion, disinformation, and quasi-military harassment, aim to gradually alter the status quo and achieve strategic goals without triggering a conventional war.
China primarily executes these strategies through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, deliberately blurring the line between civilian and military roles. The intrusion patterns manifest in several critical ways:
Exploiting dual-use commercial assets: China deploys assets like oil and gas exploration platforms, owned by state-owned enterprises such as the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, deep within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of its neighbors. These platforms are installed without consent and possess dual-use potential, capable of being equipped with various sensors (surface search radar, optical, SIGINT, acoustic devices) to enhance surveillance, or even fitted with weapons systems.
Weaponizing civilian shipping: China utilizes large Roll-on/Roll-off (RO-RO) ferries, built to military standards, as key civilian vessels under the MCF strategy. These vessels can rapidly convert to military transports, filling gaps in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) amphibious transport capability. Anomalous behaviors associated with these ships include prolonged, low-speed loitering in sensitive areas (such as Taiwan’s northwest EEZ), frequent, suspicious changes to
destinations and estimated arrival times and suspicious draft changes while in open sea, which could indicate the loading or unloading of military equipment or personnel.
Deceptive maritime militia activity: China’s maritime militia frequently uses fishing vessels to conduct illicit activities (such as hydrographic surveys and battlefield preparation) under the cover of fishing. These militia boats often engage in deceptive practices, such as frequently manipulating their Automatic Identification System (AIS) status (“going dark”) to conceal their true positions and constantly changing their ship names, sometimes over 1,000 times a year, to confuse observers.
Layered coercive presence: In contested areas like the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island), China employs a tiered maritime force structure to maintain control and reduce the risk of direct military escalation. This structure positions maritime militia and civilian public service vessels as the first line of contact, the China Coast Guard (CCG) as the second line and the PLA’s naval and air forces as the third line of deterrence.
Consequences for Taiwan and the Philippines
These gray zone activities cause severe complications for regional democracies like Taiwan and the Philippines.
For Taiwan, the intrusions directly undermine sovereignty. Activities like unauthorized oil and gas exploration in Taiwan’s EEZ are intended to advance territorial claims, reject Taiwan’s jurisdiction and normalize the encroachment upon its sovereign rights. Furthermore, the military potential of dual-use platforms and the blurring of roles between civilian and military vessels create significant early warning challenges for Taiwan’s security forces. The PLA’s increasing use of civil ships for quasi-military exercises (such as those involving RO-RO ferries
near Taiwan’s sea space and in the South China Sea) tests Taiwan’s vigilance and reaction thresholds.
In the South China Sea, particularly around the Scarborough Shoal, China’s actions against the Philippines and others demonstrate overt coercion. The deployment of security officers, aircraft and patrol vessels, combined with aggressive enforcement tactics (such as the reported boarding and beating of Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese enforcement ships), signals a clear intent to assert sovereignty. China’s comprehensive, three-in-one maritime force structure (PLA, CCG and maritime militia) provides a flexible and massive resource advantage that exceeds the capacity of any single neighboring nation to counter. These constant maneuvers increase the potential for incidents, such as the collision between a PLA destroyer and a CCG vessel observed in August 2025, which escalate the risk of a military crisis.
Essential countermeasures
To effectively respond to this evolving gray zone threat, democratic nations must adopt a multi-faceted approach focusing on international cooperation, enhanced surveillance and consistent presence.
Diplomacy and international condemnation: States like Taiwan must continuously issue strong diplomatic protests against unilateral actions, emphasize that such behaviors violate international law (including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS) and threaten regional peace and stability. Crucially, affected nations must strengthen international coordination and cooperation with like-minded countries facing similar threats to collectively address China’s lawfare and cognitive warfare.
Technological superiority and transparency: We must enhance maritime surveillance and early warning capabilities by utilizing international intelligence sharing, satellite imagery (currently Taiwan is insufficient in space surveillance, so is working with two foreign countries to monitor China’s gray zone activities around Taiwan’s waters. These two friend countries provide their space surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities through confidential APP to Taiwan, so we are able to trace the “dark vessel” which turns off the AIS. Taiwan is building up its own space monitoring capabilities within a few years. This is also a tremendous part to deter China’s gray zone activities.) and air/sea patrols. Crucially, nations should reference methods used by experts, such as the data analysis framework integrating AIS data, to systematically identify and expose suspicious civil vessel activities. This is essential for distinguishing between legitimate commercial activities and secret operations. Furthermore, states should collect complete evidence of MCF vessels’ movements to build a comprehensive legal justification based on UNCLOS, demonstrating the illegality of the intrusive actions.
Strategic presence and deterrence: Affected countries must maintain a constant, visible presence in their EEZs, primarily through Coast Guard patrols, to assert jurisdiction and prevent Chinese vessels from operating arbitrarily. Recognizing the overwhelming resource advantage of China’s layered deployment, relevant nations (including Taiwan) should explore “existence against existence” cooperation models to jointly balance the security dynamics in the region. Finally, by actively monitoring and publicly exposing these gray zone operations, we can impose political costs on China, potentially prompting caution from their managing organizations.
The integrity of the maritime domain hinges on a coordinated, transparent, and resolute response to these deceptive and persistent gray zone tactics.
Rear Admiral Lin Chauluen (Ret.) served in the Taiwan Navy and Coast Guard for more than 35 years, during which time he was responsible for strategy planning, force build-up, and net assessment. He used to be captain of four warships, including a 10,000-ton guided-missile destroyer. Currently, he is working in Taiwan defense think tank (INDSR) as a research fellow.
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