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Imagine having seamless mobile broadband access anywhere on Earth, from the most remote deserts and oceans to disaster zones, all without the need for cell towers. That’s the promise of direct-to-cell (D2C) satellite communication, a breakthrough technology that allows ordinary, unmodified, smartphones to connect directly with satellites in low Earth orbit. Pioneered by companies like AST SpaceMobile, Lynk Global and SpaceX’s Starlink, this tech is set to change global connectivity. But as the barriers to connectivity fall, a flood of cyber threats emerge.
What is D2C and why should I care?
Traditional cellular networks rely on dense, ground-based infrastructure: ugly cell towers, fibre optic cables and data centers. D2C turns this model on its head. Satellites function like flying cell towers, using standard radio bands to connect directly with everyday smartphones, no satellite phone and no spoiled views (sorry astronomers!).
The benefits are clear: universal coverage, faster disaster response and access for underserved regions. But with the race to deployment ongoing, complex cybersecurity threats stretching from the screen to the sky may be overlooked by engineers who are simply moving too fast to see them.
The expanding attack surface
D2C systems face distinct and unique threats. Attackers don’t need physical proximity to interfere and broadcasts from orbit can be jammed or spoofed by anybody with modest technical gear. It’s not a question of if, it’s a question of when threat actors, like nation-states, test their luck on these systems.
The consequences of a D2C breach are profound. A targeted outage could disrupt emergency services, cut students off from remote learning or cripple business operations in remote regions. In developing countries, D2C satellites may become a primary method of internet access for millions of people — making any cyber event not just a technical hiccup but a social, economic and even public health crisis.
Key vulnerabilities to watch
1. Signal jamming & spoofing: Jamming floods a satellite’s receivers with gobbledygook, cutting off legitimate users. Spoofing mimics real signals to hijack data or trick devices into unsafe connections.
2. Telemetry, tracking & control (TT&C) exploits: TT&C systems manage the satellite’s vital functions. If breached, an attacker could redirect, disable or even take control of a satellite.
3. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks: Intercepting data between the user and ground station. It’s complex but possible, especially if encryption or routing is weak.
4. Physical threats: Cybersecurity doesn’t stop at software. Anti-satellite weapons, space debris, or directed energy attacks like space lasers could knock satellites offline or damage components.
5. Ground station weaknesses: These Earth-based links often run on cloud platforms, leaving them exposed to phishing, unpatched systems or misconfigurations.
6. Supply chain attacks: Satellites are built from parts sourced worldwide. A malicious chip or compromised firmware update could introduce vulnerabilities.
7. Human factors: Insider threats remain a wildcard. A careless administrator, a disgruntled engineer or a poorly secured login could unravel the best technical defences.
Recommendations
Securing these constellations requires a security by design approach, built from the ground up to provide protections against all threats — even the ones that haven’t been discovered yet. As these systems are global by design, an international framework should be created. This approach requires layered, coordinated and future proof action. Drawing from the principles of defence-in-depth, practical use cases and the broader threat landscape, the following proposals outline how regulatory bodies and commercial companies can work together to build resilient and secure systems.
1. Creation of an International Framework: As satellite constellations expand, securing them requires more than isolated national efforts. A unified, multi-stakeholder framework is essential, one that includes space agencies, defense bodies such as the U.S. Space Force, commercial operators like Starlink or AST SpaceMobile and regulators.
A start could be a cybersecurity council facilitated by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). This body could share threat intelligence and outline global standards. Modelled on organizations like the International Civil Aviation Organization, the council would align national and commercial actors around shared protocols, using frameworks like NIST and ISO/IEC 27001 to ensure accountability and reduce fragmentation.
2. Defense-in-depth architectures: A defense-in-depth model that uses multiple layers of security controls to protect data and information should be foundational in all space system architectures. In practice, this means that engineers developing these systems should install additional layers of security to delay, detect and deny attacks.
Key elements include:
- AI-driven anomaly detection at both satellite and ground levels.
- Moving target defenses that rotate system configurations to reduce predictability.
- Segmenting networks to isolate damage and contain lateral movement during an incident.
- Redundant ground stations for use in case of compromise to minimize downtime.
3. Modernize cryptographic approaches: According to Edward Smith of the Defense Department’s Cybersecurity & Information Systems Information Analysis Center (CSIAC), “Encryption enhances security in space networks, carefully considering its impact on performance and developing advanced encryption methods are essential to mitigate potential vulnerabilities.”
Operators should prioritize upgrading existing systems with post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, implement strong key management practices and adopt zero-trust architectures to mitigate present-day risks while preparing for the eventual rise of quantum attackers.
In time, the industry can move beyond traditional public key infrastructure models that assume robust hardware and terrestrial conditions. For cubesats and small-scale systems, lightweight encryption schemes and chaos-based algorithms that offer better performance with lower power and processing demands.
4. Harden ground stations and TT&C links: Ground infrastructure remains one of the most targeted points in space communication networks. The 2022 KA-SAT incident, where Russia-linked hackers disabled satellite modems is a prime example. The operator is responsible for ensuring that ground stations and TT&C links are adequately secure, employing techniques like:
- Deploying digital beamforming with phased array antennas to reduce signal interception.
- Implementing end-to-end encryption for TT&C traffic.
- Continuously monitoring command traffic for unauthorized or anomalous patterns.
- Implementing secure physical security surrounding all ground stations including staff trained on social engineering detection techniques and multi-factor authentication.
These measures should be validated through red-teaming exercises and simulated disruptions.
5. Mission readiness and workforce training: Cybersecurity should not be treated as a back-office IT concern. It must be embedded into launch planning, mission operations and workforce development. While regulators should establish a realistic baseline minimum for cybersecurity posture across their respective space sectors, organizations should not wait for mandates to act. A proactive approach is essential to ensuring the maximum level of readiness.
All mission operators and contractors should be trained to a common cybersecurity standard, such as NIST’s NICE framework or ISO/IEC 27001’s audit guidelines. Tabletop exercises and simulation-based training like mimicking a spoofed control command or a ground station DDoS should be recurring elements of preparedness protocols.
6. Conduct annual audits and adopt industry-specific metrics: Regular internal and external cybersecurity audits are essential for resilience. These should be commissioned by the operator to test their posture and go beyond compliance checklists to include penetration testing, zero-day scenario analysis and evaluation of incident response effectiveness. Metrics that can be audited include:
- Employee resistance to social engineering or phishing attempts.
- Mean time to detect satellite anomalies.
- Mean time to respond to known threats.
- Intrusion attempt frequency per mission.
7. Align incentives for operators: To drive broader compliance, regulatory bodies and insurers could align financial and operational incentives with strong cybersecurity performance. Satellite operators that demonstrate adherence to cybersecurity baselines in areas like zero-trust architecture and end-to-end encryption could receive reduced insurance premiums and faster regulatory clearance for launches. This approach would reward proactive behavior while discouraging corner-cutting on security, in addition to the penalties already in place in most countries with regards to data breaches.
8. Invest in threat research: All involved parties with means should invest in R&D areas that future-proof systems, Secure software defined networking for flexible satellite-ground links and formal verification methods for satellite firmware and chip components. Completing this work collaboratively across academic labs, defense research agencies and private innovation centers can avoid redundant or siloed knowledge.
9. Create a shared incident database for the space sector: Space operators should contribute anonymized data on cyber incidents to a shared threat intelligence platform modelled after aviation’s ASRS. Such a database would support:
- Early warning systems for new vulnerabilities.
- Trends analysis across vendors and missions.
- Identification of systemic failures before they become endemic.
Managing this platform under a neutral party like UNOOSA or the Space ISAC would ensure buy-in and minimize reputational risks that might otherwise discourage disclosure.
D2C satellite communication is likely going to redefine how the world connects, and it’s coming sooner than you may think. But its success hinges on more than rocket science. It depends on engineers and security professionals ensuring they can build systems that are not just cutting edge, but resilient. Cybersecurity isn’t just a nice-to-have, it’s mission-critical. Failure to properly implement security measures may result in more than individual mission failures, it could destroy public trust in critical infrastructure, create extensive monetary ramifications and cause ripples across global networks dependent on satellite data.
Jamie Munro holds a First-Class BSc Honours degree in Cyber Security and Networks from Glasgow Caledonian University and is currently an IT Engineer working in the UK Public Sector.
SpaceNews is committed to publishing our community’s diverse perspectives. Whether you’re an academic, executive, engineer or even just a concerned citizen of the cosmos, send your arguments and viewpoints to opinion@spacenews.com to be considered for publication online or in our next magazine. The perspectives shared in these op-eds are solely those of the authors.
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